some more....


----------------------------#8-----------------------------------------

This article from NYTimes.com
You have to get a user name for the NY Times website to view it on their
site, but it is there....here it is if you don't want to sign up.
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/09/in...al/09TTEX.html

New York Times
C.I.A. Letter to Senate on Baghdad's Intentions

Following is the text of a letter dated Oct. 7 to Senator Bob Graham,
Florida Democrat and chairman of the Intelligence Committee, by George J.
Tenet, director of central intelligence, about decisions to declassify
material related to the debate about Iraq:

In response to your letter of 4 October 2002, we have made unclassified
material available to further the Senate's forthcoming open debate on a
Joint Resolution concerning Iraq.
As always, our declassification efforts seek a balance between your need for
unfettered debate and our need to protect sources and methods. We have also
been mindful of a shared interest in not providing to Saddam a blueprint of
our intelligence capabilities and shortcomings, or with insight into our
expectation of how he will and will not act. The salience of such concerns
is only heightened by the possibility of hostilities between the U.S. and
Iraq.
These are some of the reasons why we did not include our classified
judgments on Saddam's decision-making regarding the use of weapons of mass
destruction (W.M.D.) in our recent unclassified paper on Iraq's Weapons of
Mass Destruction. Viewing your request with those concerns in mind, however,
we can declassify the following from the paragraphs you requested:
Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist
attacks with conventional or C.B.W. against the United States.
Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred,
he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist
actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means, as with Iraq's
unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or C.B.W..
Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists
in conducting a W.M.D. attack against the United States would be his last
chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.
Regarding the 2 October closed hearing, we can declassify the following
dialogue:

Senator Levin: . . . If (Saddam) didn't feel threatened, did not feel
threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of
mass destruction?

Senior Intelligence Witness: . . . My judgment would be that the probability
of him initiating an attack — let me put a time frame on it — in the
foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I
think would be low.

Senator Levin: Now if he did initiate an attack you've . . . indicated he
would probably attempt clandestine attacks against us . . . But what about
his use of weapons of mass destruction? If we initiate an attack and he
thought he was in extremis or otherwise, what's the likelihood in response
to our attack that he would use chemical or biological weapons?

Senior Intelligence Witness: Pretty high, in my view.

In the above dialogue, the witness's qualifications — "in the foreseeable
future, given the conditions we understand now" — were intended to
underscore that the likelihood of Saddam using W.M.D. for blackmail,
deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal builds. Moreover, if Saddam
used W.M.D., it would disprove his repeated denials that he has such
weapons.

--------------------------------#9--------------------------------------

This article is also from NYTimes.com
Full text of FBI agent Colleen Rowleys letter to FBI director Robert Mueller
(She was the FBI agent who warned of suspected terrorists in US Flight
schools before 9/11)
You have to get a user name for the NY Times website to view it on their
site, but it is there....here it is if you don't want to sign up.

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/05/po...9a6e8f9888d09d

Following is the full text from a Feb. 26 letter to Director Robert S.
Mueller III of the F.B.I. from Special Agent Coleen Rowley of the bureau's
field office in Minneapolis.
Minneapolis, MN 55401
February 26, 2003
FBI Director Robert Mueller
FBI Headquarters
Washington
D.C.

Dear Director Mueller:
In June, 2002, on the eve of my testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
you told me that you appreciate constructive criticism and that FBI agents
should feel free to voice serious concerns they may have about senior-level
FBI actions. Since then I have availed myself twice of your stated openness.
At this critical point in our country's history I have decided to try once
again, on an issue of even more consequence for the internal security
posture of our country. That posture has been weakened by the diversion of
attention from al-Qaeda to our government's plan to invade Iraq, a step that
will, in all likelihood, bring an exponential increase in the terrorist
threat to the U.S., both at home and abroad.

In your recent testimony to the Senate, you noted that "the al-Qaeda network
will remain for the foreseeable future the most immediate and serious threat
facing this country," adding that "the prevention of another terrorist
attack remains the FBI's top priority." You then noted that a "U.S.-Iraq war
could prompt Baghdad to more directly engage al-Qaeda and perhaps provide it
with weapons of mass destruction." But you did not connect these very
important dots. Your recent briefings of field management staff have thrown
light on the immense pressures you face as you try to keep the FBI intact
and functioning amid persistent calls for drastic restructuring. You have
made it clear that the FBI is perilously close to being divided up and is
depending almost solely upon the good graces of Attorney General Ashcroft
and President Bush for its continued existence. Clearly, this tense
environment poses a special challenge to those like you who are responsible
for providing unbiased, objective intelligence and national security advice
to the country's leaders. But I would implore you to step out of this
pressure-cooker for a few minutes and consider the following: 1) The FBI is
apparently the source for the public statement that there are 5,000 al-Qaeda
terrorists already in the U.S. I would ask you to inquire as to whether this
figure is based on any hard data. If it is, rather, an estimate based
largely on speculation, this can only feed the suspicion, inside the
organization and out, that it is largely the product of a desire to gain
favor with the administration, to gain support for FBI initiatives and
possibly even to gain support for the administration's initiatives. 2) What
is the FBI's evidence with respect to a connection between al-Qaeda and
Iraq? Polls show that Americans are completely confused about who was
responsible for the suicidal attacks on 9-11 with many blaming Iraq. And it
is clear that this impression has been fostered by many in the
Administration. As far as the FBI is concerned, is the evidence of such a
link "bulletproof," as Defense Secretary Rumsfeld claims, or "scant," as
General Brent Scowcroft, Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory
Board has said? The answer to this is of key importance in determining
whether war against Iraq makes any sense from the FBI's internal security
point of view. If the FBI does have independent data verifying such a
connection, it would seem such information should be shared, at least
internally within the FBI. 3) If, as you have said, "the prevention of
another terrorist attack remains the FBI's top priority," why is it that we
have not attempted to interview Zacarias Moussaoui, the only suspect in U.S.
custody charged with having a direct hand in the horror of 9-11? Although
al-Qaeda has taken pains to compartmentalize its operations to avoid
compromise by any one operative, information obtained from some al-Qaeda
operatives has nonetheless proved invaluable. Moussaoui almost certainly
would know of other al-Qaeda contacts, possibly in the U.S., and would also
be able to alert us to the motive behind his and Mohammed Atta's interest in
crop dusting. Similarly, there is the question as to why little or no
apparent effort has been made to interview convicted terrorist Richard Reid,
who obviously depended upon other al-Qaeda operatives in fashioning his shoe
explosive. Nor have possible links between Moussaoui and Reid been fully
investigated. It therefore appears that the government may have sacrificed
the possibility of acquiring information pertinent to future attacks, in
order to conduct criminal prosecution of these two individuals. Although
prosecution serves worthy purposes, including deterrence, standard practice
in "Organized Crime/Terrorism 101" dictates imaginative, concerted attempts
to make inroads into well-organized, cohesive groups. And sometimes that
requires "dealing with the devil." In short, it is a matter of priorities.
And lack of follow-through with regard to Moussaoui and Reid gives a hollow
ring to our "top priority;" i. e., preventing another terrorist attack. 4)
It is not clear that you have been adequately apprized of the potential
damage to our liaison relationships with European intelligence agencies that
is likely to flow from the growing tension over Iraq between senior U.S.
officials and their counterparts in key West European countries. There are
far more al-Qaeda operatives in Europe than in the U.S., and European
intelligence services, including the French, are on the frontlines in
investigating and pursuing them. Indeed, the Europeans have successfully
uncovered and dismantled a number of active cells in their countries. In the
past, FBI liaison agents stationed in Europe benefitted from the expertise
and cooperation of European law enforcement and intelligence officers.
Information was shared freely, and was of substantial help to us in our
investigations in the U.S. You will recall that prior to 9-11, it was the
French who passed us word of Moussaoui's link to terrorism. 5) I know the
FBI is no longer (or will shortly be no longer) in charge of regulating the
color codes, but I expect we will still have input. I realize that decisions
to change color codes are made at the most senior level, but perhaps you can
caution senior officials about the downside to alarming the public unless
there is adequate reason to do so. Increased vigilance must be encouraged
when needed, but the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces can easily get bogged
down in attempting to pursue all the leads engendered by panicky citizens.
This, in turn, draws resources away from more important, well predicated and
already established investigations. Unintended consequences like the recent
stampede in the Chicago dance club (which initial news accounts reported to
be the case) can also occur when the public is put on these heightened
alerts. The terrorists win in such circumstances even without attacking. 6)
The vast majority of the one thousand plus persons "detained" in the wake of
9-11 did not turn out to be terrorists. They were mostly illegal aliens. We
have every right, of course, to deport those identified as illegal aliens
during the course of any investigation. But after 9-11, Headquarters
encouraged more and more detentions for what seem to be essentially PR
purposes. Field offices were required to report daily the number of
detentions in order to supply grist for statements on our progress in
fighting terrorism. The balance between individuals' civil liberties and the
need for effective investigation is hard to maintain even during so-called
normal times, let alone times of increased terrorist threat or war. It is,
admittedly, a difficult balancing act. But from what I have observed,
particular vigilance may be required to head off undue pressure (including
subtle encouragement) to detain or "round up" suspectsparticularly those of
Arabic origin. 7) As I believe you know, I have a reputation for being quite
"conservative" on legal and policy issues regarding law enforcement. I have
complained loudly on occasions when some of our laws and procedures
have-unnecessarily, in my view, hindered our ability to move boldly against
crime. At the same time, I know from experience that the FBI's policy on
permissible use of deadly force has served the FBI and the country well. It
should be noted, however, that the Administration's new policy of
"preemptive strikes" abroad is not consistent with the Department of
Justice's (DOJ's) "deadly force policy" for law enforcement officers. DOJ
policy restricts federal agents to using deadly force only when presented
with an imminent threat of death or serious injury (essentially in
self-defense or defense of an innocent third party). I believe it would be
prudent to be on guard against the possibility that the looser "preemptive
strike" rationale being applied to situations abroad could migrate back
home, fostering a more permissive attitude towards shootings by law
enforcement officers in this country. 8) I believe the FBI, by drawing on
the perspective gained from its recent history, can make a unique
contribution to the discussion on Iraq. The misadventure in Waco took place
well before your time as Director, but you will probably recall that David
Koresh exerted the same kind of oppressive control over members of his
Branch Davidian followers, as Saddam Hussein does over the Iraqis. The
parallel does not stop there. Law enforcement authorities were certain
Koresh had accumulated a formidable arsenal of weapons and ammunition at his
compound and may have been planning on using them someday. The FBI also had
evidence that he was sexually abusing young girls in the cult. After the
first law enforcement assault failed, after losing the element of surprise,
the Branch Davidian compound was contained and steadily increasing pressure
was applied for weeks. But then the FBI decided it could wait no longer and
mounted the second assaultwith disastrous consequences. The children we
sought to liberate all died when Koresh and his followers set fires leading
to their mass death and destruction. The FBI, of course, cannot be blamed
for what Koresh set in motion. Nevertheless, we learned some lessons from
this unfortunate episode and quickly explored better ways to deal with such
challenges. As a direct result of that exploration, many subsequent
criminal/terrorist "standoffs" in which the FBI has been involved have been
resolved peacefully and effectively. I would suggest that present
circumstances vis-a-vis Iraq are very analagous, and that you consider
sharing with senior administration officials the important lessons learned
by the FBI at Waco. You are only too well aware that fighting the war on
terrorism and crime is an unbelievably difficult mission that will only
become more difficult in the years to come, adversely affecting future
generations of Americans. The extraneous pressures currently being brought
to bear by politicians of both parties upon the FBI and other U.S.
intelligence agencies, however, only worsen the present situation. I know
that my comments appear so presumptuous for a person of my rank in the
organization and I'm very sorry for that impression. A word of explanation
is therefore probably in order as to why I feel moved to write you directly
about these issues. A good part of the reason lies in a promise I made to
myself after I realized the enormity of what resulted when FBI Headquarters
Supervisory personnel dismissed the warnings of Minneapolis agents
pre-September 11, 2001. I was well aware of the forceful but frustrated
efforts being made by Minneapolis case agents and their supervisor in their
efforts to get Headquarters to move. But since my own role was peripheral, I
did not think I could be of much additional help. Since that fateful day of
September 11, 2001, however, I have not ceased to regret that perhaps I did
not do all that I might have done. I promised myself that in the future I
would always try. I appreciate that you alone do not determine policy on the
terrorist threat from inside or outside the countrythat, indeed, you may
have little influence in the crafting of broad domestic or foreign policy.
And it seems clear to me now that the decision to attack Iraq was taken some
time ago and you, even as FBI Director, may be little more than a helpless
bystander. Such an attack, though, may have grave consequences for your
ability to discharge your responsibility to protect Americans, and it is
altogether likely that you will find yourself a helpless bystander to a rash
of 9-11s. The bottom line is this: We should be deluding neither ourselves
nor the American people that there is any way the FBI, despite the various
improvements you are implementing, will be able to stem the flood of
terrorism that will likely head our way in the wake of an attack on Iraq.
What troubles me most is that I have no assurance that you have made that
clear to the president. If you believe my concerns have merit, I would ask
you to share them with the president and attorney general. We no doubt can
agree that our Government has a gargantuan task facing it of melding
American foreign policy to make the world, and primarily United States soil,
a safer place. I pray for our American and allied world leaders' success in
achieving this most important objective. Thank you so much for allowing me
to express these thoughts. They are personal in nature and should not be
construed as representing the view of any FBI unit or other agents. Yours
truly, Coleen Rowley Special Agent, Minneapolis