Senator Levin: . . . If (Saddam) didn't feel threatened, did not feel
threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of
mass destruction?

Senior Intelligence Witness: . . . My judgment would be that the probability
of him initiating an attack — let me put a time frame on it — in the
foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I
think would be low.

Senator Levin: Now if he did initiate an attack you've . . . indicated he
would probably attempt clandestine attacks against us . . . But what about
his use of weapons of mass destruction? If we initiate an attack and he
thought he was in extremis or otherwise, what's the likelihood in response
to our attack that he would use chemical or biological weapons?

Senior Intelligence Witness: Pretty high, in my view.

In the above dialogue, the witness's qualifications — "in the foreseeable
future, given the conditions we understand now" — were intended to
underscore that the likelihood of Saddam using W.M.D. for blackmail,
deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal builds. Moreover, if Saddam
used W.M.D., it would disprove his repeated denials that he has such
weapons.